No matter how draconian, gun control laws are weakly enforced (at least in the United States) and seldom of any significant effect in reducing crime. 1 The kind of citizen who will comply with a gun law is the opposite of the person who will use a gun to facilitate his or her crimes. The problem of weak enforcement is highlighted by a candid interview with the author of the District of Columbia's 1968 gun registration scheme while the District's 1975-76 gun ban was under consideration:
The problem, [Hechinger] said, is the failure of the mayor and police department to enforce the [current] regulations. "Not only didn't they enforce them; the[y] didn't even publicize them," he said.
If the city's executives were lax on gun laws, its judiciary was hardly better. Of 184 persons prosecuted and convicted for first-time gun possession in the first six months of last year, only 14 received jail sentences.
One judge, according to a report to the House District Committee last week, awarded a jail sentence to only one of 73 gun offenders convicted in his court. 2 This led a prominent newspaper commentator to remark that "[i]t might be a good idea to try enforcing the old gun law before rushing to enact new ones." 3 Even as they were voting for the new gun ban, D.C. politicians were admitting that it was a mere placebo. City Councilman Marion Berry (later to become Mayor) admitted: "Massachusetts has stringent gun control and armed robbery has not decreased but increased. The TV creates far more violence than any gun lobbyist. I, too, am going to vote for this bill [sic] that I want it understood that I realize it's not adequate . . . ."
4 Councilman Jerry Moore made the same point saying that he had "no illusions about this law-it won't take guns off the streets." 5 So the question becomes, "Why enact them?" Is there a hidden political dynamic? But "hidden" means hard to find. So maybe we should look for the answer in a related jurisdiction that keeps more extensive records of its government's deliberations.
II. A LOOK AT BRITAIN
In 1870, there were no laws regulating the possession, purchase, and peaceful carrying of firearms in Britain. 6 Anyone, child or adult, could buy a pistol, load it, and carry it under his coat with no legal consequences. As late as 1920, the law presented no obstacle to an adult without a criminal history purchasing a rifle, shotgun, or pistol, and carrying it concealed upon his person. 7 Yet today, Britain has some of the most restrictive gun control laws in the world. 8 The Firearms Act of 1920 9 was a watershed of British firearms control. From its passage, the ownership of firearms ceased to be a right of Englishmen, and instead became a privilege-one increasingly restricted over the intervening 75 years. 10 Under the direction of the Home Office, police discretion in licensing throughout Britain has made ownership of firearms an increasingly rare event.
11 Why was the Firearms Act of 1920 passed?
There are several possible causes for the Firearms Act of 1920, all of which are plausible explanations: concern about criminal misuse of firearms; gun running to Ireland; increased political violence in the pre-World War I period. Yet, examination of the Cabinet papers declassified in 1970, 12 and Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones's diaries, 13 shows that all of these other concerns were insignificant compared to the fear of Bolshevik revolution.
III. A BRITON'S TRADITIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE ARMS
First of all, it is necessary to clearly understand that the absence of firearms controls was not because low crime rates made them unnecessary, but because Britons considered the possession of arms to be a right. The English Bill of Rights (1689) asserted by its passage that the people were "vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties," including the seventh article: "That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law."
60

MAINE LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 61:1 RIGHT 43-49 (1984 The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. . . . [I] t is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.
17
Both the English Bill of Rights and Blackstone's remarks show that significant restrictions ("suitable to their condition and degree") hemmed in this right. Nonetheless, both still defined this as a right to arms.
Jacobite absolutism seemed an adequate reason in 1689 to enshrine the Protestant Englishman's right to arms, especially since the English Bill of Rights limited only the power of the sovereign, not of Parliament. But, as Joyce Malcolm observes, "It is easy to defend popular liberties when 'things remain in their legal and settled course,' but far more difficult when anarchy, not absolutism, threatens."
18
London's Gordon Riots of 1780 were one of those times when anarchy seemed to be a real risk. 19 In the aftermath of those riots, Members of Parliament faulted the government for actions it took and actions it did not take. 20 In particular, the Duke of Richmond objected to the conduct of the Commander in Chief of the army, for the letters he sent to Colonel Twisleton, who commanded the military force in the City, ordering him to disarm the citizens, who had taken up arms, and formed themselves into associations, for the defence of their lives and properties. These letters he considered as a violation of the constitutional right of Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for their own defence. 21 Lord Amherst agreed that the disarming order was intended only for the rioters, "but no passage in his letter could be construed to mean, that the arms should be taken from the associated citizens, who had very properly armed themselves for the defence of their lives and property."
22
The duality of the contemporary usage was shown by a contemporaneous pronouncement by the Recorder of London-the city's chief legal officer-when asked if the right to have arms in the English Declaration of Rights protected armed defensive groups as well as armed individuals.
The right of his majesty's Protestant subjects, to have arms for their own defence, and to use them for lawful purposes, is most clear and undeniable. It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not only as a right, but as a duty; for all the subjects of the realm, who are able to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and other civil magistrates, in the execution of the laws and the preservation of the public peace. And that right, which every Protestant most unquestionably possesses, individually, may, and in many cases must, be exercised collectively, is likewise a point which I conceive to be most clearly established by the authority of judicial decisions and ancient acts of parliament, as well as by reason and common sense.
23
The common law was in agreement. In his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries that appeared in the 1790s, Edward Christian described the rights of Englishmen (the rights which every American colonist had been promised) in these terms: "everyone is at liberty to keep or carry a gun, if he does not use it for the [unlawful] destruction of game." 24 This right was separate from militia duties.
25
The agricultural slump after the Napoleonic Wars three decades later led to widespread unrest, riots, and assemblies calling for Parliamentary reform. 26 After the so-called Peterloo massacre, the conflict between the right to bear arms and fear of working class unrest led the English courts to distinguish between the differing reasons for bearing arms. 27 The courts concluded that there was an individual right to bear arms for self-defense, but there was no right to carry arms to a public meeting if the number of arms "so carried are calculated to produce terror and alarm."
28
More ominously, the Seizure of Arms Act, one of the "Six Acts" passed in 1819 by Parliament in response to the unrest, provided for constables to search for and seize arms on the testimony of a single person that they were being kept for a purpose "dangerous to the public peace." 29 The Seizure of Arms Act was limited to the industrial areas where riots took place, and with a two-year expiration period. Even Lord Castlereagh, then foreign secretary, admitted that "it was an infringement upon the rights and duties of the people, and that it could only be defended upon the necessity of the case. But that necessity now existed . . . ."
33 Similar measures had been applied to civil war in Scotland and Ireland in the past, Castlereagh observed. M.P. Brougham pointed out that in both cases; however, these civil wars had involved foreign assistance-unlike this case.
34
Yet, even the Seizure of Arms Act had made distinctions based on the function of different classes of arms that were to be seized. "Any pike, pike head or spear in the possession of any person or in any house or place" was subject to confiscation, but "any dirk, dagger, pistol or gun or other weapon" was to be seized only if they were possessed for "any purpose dangerous to the public peace." 35 This distinguished between weapons perceived as offensive and defensive, for even the supporters of the Seizure of Arms Act generally accepted the right to possess arms for self-defense.
36
The Seizure of Arms Act expired after two years, and Parliament passed no similar restrictions between 1819 and the end of the nineteenth century, even during the turbulence of the Chartist movement 37 and repeated assassination attempts on Queen Victoria with pistols. 38 Greenwood suggests that by the time of the Chartists, the professionalization of the police forces meant that the government relied less upon paid informants as a source of information on subversives.
39 Paid informants were prone to exaggeration because they perceived that their value to the police was dependent on the seriousness of the information they provided. 40 In addition, information provided by firearms manufacturers persuaded the Home Secretary that the Chartists were not arming for revolution, despite alarming newspaper accounts to the contrary. Other sources suggest that some Members of Parliament had other motivations besides revenue. During debate concerning amendments to the Act in 1879, in which Sir Alexander Gordon argued that the measure had created great difficulties for farmers, who had previously been allowed to possess firearms for frightening away birds without needing to obtain a game license, Gordon asserted that the Secretary to the Treasury "said he did not believe the Bill would in any way promote the preservation of game, and he had supported it on the sole ground that it would be useful in securing the registering of arms in this country."
44 Gordon further asserts that the then Chancellor of the Exchequer's stated purpose was "to discourage the lower classes from habitually carrying deadly weapons."
45 However, because the act applied only to the carrying of guns, it did not even serve the stated purpose of keeping guns out of the hands of the dangerous classes.
46
Other Members of Parliament during those debates acknowledged that the Gun Licences Act of 1870 had caused considerable upset among farmers, and did not even accomplish the questionable goal of registering guns primarily intended for use in Ireland, "where the Government were anxious to find out who were in possession of guns." Therefore, if there was not sufficient support to repeal the law, it should be reformed.
47
Parliament considered several firearms control bills between the Gun Licences Act of 1870 and the end of the century. These bills either sought to enhance penalties for armed burglary, or to require a hunting or carrying license as a condition of purchasing a handgun. 48 The combination of substantial opposition to restrictions on arms and a perception that the bills were superfluous caused all to die on the first or second reading in the House of Commons. Reading of his 1895 Pistols Bill in the Commons, he "complained that he would have preferred a Bill which provided that no one but a soldier, sailor or policeman should have a pistol at all, because they were a source of danger to their possessors . . . ."
51
The Pistols Act of 1903, in contrast to the similar, somewhat more restrictive measures introduced in 1893 and 1895, passed with little debate.
52 Greenwood suggests that because proof of being a householder was one of the three methods by which a buyer qualified to buy a handgun, this measure was not regarded as an attack on the right to bear arms. 53 Since the stated goal was to prevent children from buying handguns from retailers, and it accomplished that and nothing else, the Pistols Act was uncontroversial. 54 The Pistols Act required buyers of pistols to either "produce[] a gun or game licence then in force" or provide the seller "reasonable proof that he is a person entitled to use or carry a gun without a gun or game licence."
55 Even this requirement, however, did not apply if "being a householder, he proposes to use such pistol only in his own house" or that he provide a statement that "he is about to proceed abroad for a period of not less than six months" signed by a police officer or justice of the peace and himself. 56 Other provisions prohibited sale to any person under 18 years of age, or who was "intoxicated or is not of sound mind."
57 And unsurprisingly, this law did not apply in Ireland. 58 The absence of laws regulating handgun ownership might be evidence that private ownership in Britain was rare as the nineteenth century waned. The literature of the period, however, shows that handguns as defensive weapons were considered an ordinary part of British life. H. G. Wells's The Invisible Man portrays both American visitors and Britons using pistols for self-defense, with an awareness that British lawful use of deadly force was more restrictive than in America: "Draw the bolts," said the man with the black beard, "and if he comes-" He showed a revolver in his hand.
"That won't do," said the policeman; "that's murder." "I know what country I'm in," said the man with the beard. "I'm going to let off at his legs. Draw the bolts." 59 In the climax of the novel, a police official asks a British civilian for a revolver with the expectation that there is one in the house. 60 Similarly, in Wells describes a young lady defending herself from ruffians with a revolver she keeps under the seat of her carriage, with no indication that this was surprising or unusual.
61
Bram Stoker's fiction also provides some idea of how late-Victorian society regarded handguns. The Squaw, published in the mid-1890s, depicts the relationship between an upper class British couple on their honeymoon in Nurnberg, and "Elias P. Hutcheson, hailing from Isthmian City, Bleeding Gulch, Maple Tree County, Nebraska," a figure who is portrayed as comical, but also decent, intelligent, wellintentioned-and armed: "I say, ma'am, you needn't be skeered over that cat. I go heeled, I du!" Here he slapped his pistol pocket at the back of his lumbar region. "Why sooner'n have you worried, I'll shoot the critter, right here, an' risk the police interferin' with a citizen of the United States for carryin' arms contrairy to reg'lations!" 62 Hutcheson meets a tragic end, but Stoker treats his carrying of a pistol in violation of German law as colorful, with no more horror than we regard driving slightly over the speed limit on the highway.
Dracula, Stoker's most famous novel, is awash in handguns. Unlike Elias P. Hutcheson in The Squaw, the American Jonathan Harker in Dracula is not the only person armed with a handgun. Eventually, most of the vampire hunters carry them (not for use against Dracula, but for defense against his living employees).
63 Like Wells's novels, Stoker's fiction expresses neither horror nor amazement at ordinary people possessing and carrying handguns for self-defense.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories also reflect a widespread acceptance of the possession of guns. 64 While some might regard the stories as a poor example because Holmes must occasionally deal with some rough characters due to the nature of his occupation, it is not only the eccentric Holmes who possesses a revolver, but also Dr. Watson.
IV. BOLSHEVISM AND THE FIREARMS ACT OF 1920
Despite an apparent laissez-faire attitude toward firearms in the period before World War I, the British government was discussing handgun restrictions. The Home Office apparently prepared a more restrictive revision of the Pistols Act in 1911. 66 The Sidney Street Siege involving Russian anarchists that year, and the events leading up to it, caused the Home Office to introduce a somewhat narrower measure, the Aliens various Parliamentary committees in this period are seldom part of a continuous series, or consistently gathered, which makes meaningful analysis difficult. Moreover, perceptions of criminal misuse are often more important for the making of laws than actual misuse. Another factor that might explain the 1911 bill was the social chaos that developed around the suffragettes, labor struggles, and the problems of Ireland. The civility that characterized most of the Victorian and Edwardian period in Britain was unraveling.
The suffragettes were the militant faction of the movement that sought voting rights for women. The suffragettes did not request votes for women, but demanded it with a campaign of vandalism and arson intended to bully the ruling Liberal Party into compliance. While suffragette violence was directed entirely at objects, not people, author George Dangerfield makes the interesting observation that in the midst of this campaign of burning vacant buildings and smashing shop windows, "otherwise nice old ladies began to apply for gun licenses, to the terror of their local magistracy." 72 As discussed above, the gun licenses allowed not only the purchase but also the carrying of guns, and there was no way to avoid issuing the license. 73 This explains the judges' "terror."
The trade disputes led to a more serious outbreak of violence. The 1910 coal miners' strike in the Rhondda Valley in Wales caused the Home Office to send 802 police officers and several regiments of soldiers to restore order-though it is not clear how much real disorder was present when the police and army were first called. 74 The London Transport Workers' Strike of 1911 led to more serious violence, with soldiers fatally shooting strikers who attempted to block trains operated by strikebreakers.
75
The most serious of the pre-war conflicts were related to Ireland. It is no surprise that Irish Nationalists engaged in armed violence in their attempts to secure independence from Britain. It would also be no surprise if Cabinet concerns about Irish Nationalist access to weapons in Britain played some part in bringing about the Firearms Act of 1920. Ireland had long been subject to more restrictive firearms law than Britain.
76 What is surprising is how little of the secret post-war Cabinet papers suggest a linkage between violence in Ireland and British firearms restrictions.
In addition to the problems of Irish Nationalist violence, the prospect of Home Rule for Ireland led to another serious problem: the twin threats of Ulster Protestant insurrection and mutiny in the army. Sir Edward Carson led Ulster Protestants who were determined to revolt and form their own government, rather than live under the rule of Ireland's Catholic majority.
77
Sympathy for the Ulster Protestants ran high in the British Army. A number of high-ranking officers, including generals and regimental commanders, when ordered to prepare "active operations against Ulster" in 1913 or risk "dismissal with loss of pension" resigned their commissions. Yet by 1920, the problem of disarming the Irish Nationalists had acquired an English connection. A Cabinet meeting on May 31, 1920, discussed how to disarm the Irish rebels.
87 Sir Hamar Greenwood, Chief Secretary of State for Ireland, explained that it was not practical to disarm the rebels because arms were readily available in England, and easy to smuggle into Ireland: "There is nothing to stop people bringing arms from England because they are easily concealed."
88
As tempting as it is to see the Irish problem as the proximate cause for the Firearms Act of 1920, there is a chronological problem with such an explanation. By May 31, when Greenwood drew the connection between lax gun laws in Britain and the Irish problem, the Firearms Act was already on its way from the House of Lords to the Commons. 89 If the hope of disarming Irish Nationalists played a part in the Firearms Act of 1920, there is no paper trail to show a connection. The Cabinet might have previously had this concern, but did not put it into writing, and there is no evidence that the Irish problems played a direct role in causing the Firearms Act of 1920. Another motivation for the Firearms Act of 1920 was protection of the Empire (and that of other colonial powers) from national independence movements, as well as fear of foreign anarchists in Britain. In late 1918, Sir Ernley Blackwell chaired a committee whose purpose was to consider the question of the control which it is desirable to exercise over the possession, manufacture, sale, import and export of firearms and ammunition in the United Kingdom after the war, both from the point of internal policy and having regard to the Report of the Sub Committee on Arms Traffic of the Committee of Imperial Defence.
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The Blackwell Committee's report expressed concern about surplus weapons ending up in the hands of "[s]avage or semi-civilised tribesmen in outlying parts of the British Empire" and "[t]he anarchist or 'intellectual' malcontent of the great cities, whose weapon is the bomb and the automatic pistol. There is some force in the view that the latter will in future prove the more dangerous of the two."
91 It would appear that the Blackwell Committee was not concerned about non-political criminal misuse of firearms.
To reduce the supply of arms to the "tribesmen" and "anarchists," the committee suggested that licensing of firearms ownership should be discretionary on the part of the Chief Officer of Police for each district. 92 Ireland, of course, was to be subject to much stricter controls. As a consequence of the concern about "savage or semicivilized tribesmen," the British Government participated in the Paris Arms Convention of 1919. This was apparently a result of the Blackwell Committee's recommendations.
93
The Blackwell Committee's fear of native rebellion in the Empire is not surprising. The spectacle of Europeans reduced to the pointless savagery of the Great War certainly took the "advanced" Europeans down a few notches in the estimation of their colonial "children." Nationalist movements grew rapidly throughout many European empires as a result of World War I. 94 Greenwood makes much of the relationship between the Blackwell Committee's recommendations with respect to "tribesmen in outlying parts of the Empire" and the Firearms Act of 1920. 95 At first glance, this seems an obscure relationship. The Blackwell Committee hoped primarily to reduce the supply of surplus military arms. Reducing domestic sales in Britain would have been a very indirect way of disarming rebels in Kashmir or Burma. But the Firearms Act of 1920 included two quite separate sections: one that restricted firearms and ammunition ownership in Britain, and another that controlled export. From the standpoint of the rights of Englishmen, the export provisions are irrelevant, and will not be further addressed in this paper. As World War I came to a conclusion, the labor strife of the pre-war period again reared its head, with one additional ingredient in the caustic stew: Communism. An August 1917 Memorandum by Professor E. V. Arnold of Bangor University was circulated to the Cabinet at the request of Lord Milner. 96 Professor Arnold warned the Cabinet of what he termed "Labour in Revolt," a movement of younger workers that did not follow the trade union leaders. 97 Professor Arnold described "Labour in Revolt" as a doctrinaire revolutionary Marxist movement.
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While the words "Communist" and "Bolshevik" never appear in Arnold's memorandum, his language leaves no doubt that he was describing this movement. 99 Arnold also carefully distinguished this movement from the Labour Party itself.
100
In addition to the Communist workers, an additional faction became a recurring concern of the Government: soldiers. In September 1917, Lord Curzon circulated to his fellow Cabinet ministers a letter from the Bishop of Oxford entitled Alleged Disaffection Existing Among British Troops at Home.
101 The Bishop's letter warned that hunger, low pay, and a refusal to allow leave caused British soldiers to secretly put up a placard "to say they were going to imitate the Russian soldiers" and that they engaged in "open sedition in speech." 103 Lloyd George later claimed Britain "was nearer to Bolshevism that day than at any other time since." 104 Sir Basil Thomson, Scotland Yard's Director of Intelligence, wrote in late 1918 that "England would be spared the full horrors of Bolshevism," yet also believed that the nation could be severely damaged by "serious labour disturbances, carried on with the sympathy of the Police." 105 Thomson also believed that "serious labour disturbances" were beyond the control of the police in big cities.
106
Immediately after the war, a wave of Communist revolutionary actions took place on the continent. 107 In North America, government leaders interpreted a series of disturbances and strikes as evidence of Communist subversion.
108 These events created increasing levels of fear within the Cabinet and the British intelligence service. report passed up the chain of command in early 1919 with an approving cover note asserted:
I now find myself convinced that in England Bolschevism [sic] must be faced and grappled with, the efforts of the International Jews of Russia combated and their agents eliminated from the United Kingdom. Unless some serious consideration is given to the matter, I believe that there will be some sort of Revolution in this country and that before 12 months are past . . . .
109
The events of early 1919 seemed to confirm these fears of Communist revolution. A general strike in Glasgow led to the raising of the red flag over city hall. 110 The Glasgow Herald called it a first step toward Bolshevism, and the Secretary of State for Scotland called it a Bolshevik rising. 111 The army was mobilized, but the police restored order without the military's assistance. 112 In retrospect, the general strike in Glasgow was not the first step of revolution, but it is certainly understandable that the intelligence service, the Cabinet, and the king, misread it as such.
113
The concern about revolutionary violence appears to have motivated similar firearms control laws in the Dominions. 114 In Canada, the Winnipeg General Strike in May 1919 led to violence.
115 Thomson's January 22, 1920 , Report on Revolutionary Organizations in the United Kingdom described it as "not an industrial dispute but really an attempt to overthrow the constitutional government and to replace it by a form of Soviet Government planned and fashioned by the Industrial Workers of the World.
116
The "alien scum" were blamed for the labor strife. 117 In response, the Canadian Parliament passed a law in 1920 requiring a permit for anyone to possess any gun.
118
The Canadian Parliament repealed the permit requirement for Canadian citizens for rifles and shotguns (though not for handguns) in 1921.
119
New Zealand adopted a mandatory firearm registration law in 1920 because returning servicemen had brought pistols and automatic weapons back to New Zealand. 120 industrial demonstrations or even riot could occur here." 121 At least one scholar claims that Australia's gun control laws, adopted on a state-by-state basis during the period between 1921 and 1932, were adopted for similar reasons.
122
How should the British government respond to these fears? There were differing proposals within the Cabinet. On February 27, 1919, Cabinet Secretary Thomas Jones wrote to Sir Maurice Hankey about the increasing problem of labor strife, and told how several Cabinet ministers responded to proposals to defuse the concerns of the working classes with social policy changes.
123 These proposals drew "rather long faces" from several Cabinet ministers, who wanted to restrict spending. 124 Remarking on the amount the ministers were willing to spend, Jones wrote, "It was blank nonsense to talk of a bagatelle like £71,000,000-a cheap insurance against Bolshevism." 125 Crisis after crisis increased the Cabinet's fears of revolution. When the Triple Alliance of miners, railway workers, and transport workers demanded higher wages and shorter hours in February 1919, Prime Minister Lloyd George appealed to patriotism, asserting that the government would fall if they called a general strike: "I feel bound to tell you that in our opinion we are at your mercy. The Army is disaffected and cannot be relied upon . . . . In these circumstances, if you carry out your threat and strike, then you will defeat us."
126
Throughout 1919, fear of revolution rose and fell, depending on the events of the moment, but the undercurrent of fear never went away.
127 The Cabinet's Strike Committee responded to a railroad strike on September 26, 1919, with orders to the army to secure railroads and power stations against sabotage.
128 The Committee also concluded that a "Citizen Guard" was now necessary to deal with the danger of a general strike.
129 Though the Cabinet abandoned the Citizen Guard plans when the railroad strike was settled on October 5, 1919, 130 this proposal-and the fears it represented-reappeared in 1920.
131 Perhaps indicative of the Cabinet's belief in the power of armed civilians, the British government reacted with anger at a 1920 plan by the Soviet government to impose a "civic militia" of armed Polish workers on defeated Poland, for the apparent purpose of bringing about a Communist coup.
132
As 1920 opened, the Cabinet's fear of Communist revolution was again on the rise. The January 7, 1920, report The Labour Situation from the Ministry of Labour warns of a leftist newspaper that "announces an attempt is to be made within the few months to overthrow democratic government and to set up some form of 'Soviet' rule, by means of a 'general strike,' and anticipates that this strike will be accompanied by an upheaval in Ireland."
133
The workers were also described as increasingly unwilling to listen to labor union leaders, 134 with the more radical labor newspapers distinguishing between "reactionary Trade Union officials" and radical parts of "political Labour." While many of Thomson's intelligence reports seem to fit into the concern about Communist revolution, others suggest that he did not consider this a likely occurrence -unlike the Cabinet ministers. Thomson's January 22, 1920, Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom acknowledged that reports were circulating in London "that a revolution is to be expected within the next two months."
138 But Thomson's report also insisted "the minority that would like to see a sudden and violent revolution is ridiculously small."
139 Instead, his concern was about "[t]he flow of Bolshevik propaganda, which is very ably written, will inevitably be greatly increased when trade is opened with Russia."
140 Thomson proposed new legislation instead to deal with such propaganda; he worried more about the pen than the sword.
141
A worrisome issue raised in Thompson's January 9, 1920, Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom was unemployment among recently demobilized soldiers, "which is driving many of the more moderately-minded exService men into the revolutionary camp."
142 The demobilization and reduction of war production produced a rapid increase in unemployment in 1919, only somewhat alleviated in 1920. Thomson's January 9, 1920, report also warns of the growth of the National Union of Ex-Service Men. The National Union was a radical faction of discontented veterans that was developing ties to more mainstream veterans' organizations, as well as to officials of the Police Union. 144 The goal of the National Union, in the words of its national secretary, was to form "Sailors', Soldiers' and Workers' Councils with a view to taking over the means of production, distribution and exchange and thereby freeing the workers from wage slavery and exploitation." 145 Thomson's January 22, 1920, Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom also warned of the close ties between the National Union, the Labour Party, and a supposed "Red Army" being organized in Reading by an "Ex-Lieutenant Nicholson."
146
Why was there such concern about veterans? We can deduce from Secret Cabinet reports that some of the concern stemmed from the weakness of the military. Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, issued a report titled Capacity of the Army to Assist the Civil Power in Industrial Disturbances. 147 The report warned in its somewhat ungrammatical cover memorandum, " [T] he whole question of the use to be made of the Army in any future internal trouble gives grave cause for anxiety. Not only will the Army be . . . far too weak to give the full measure of assistance to the police necessitated by disturbances on a large scale."
148
After warning that the Army lacked the capacity to guard its own facilities without assistance from the civil authorities, Wilson also cautioned, "If it is called upon at an early stage to assist the Civil Authorities, it will be dispersed, and thus the last in the hands of the Government will be dissipated." 149 Wilson believed that at least 40,000 troops would be needed to restore order in an emergency.
150 By March, the British Army in Great Britain would be reduced to 25,000, many of them "young soldiers with little training, insufficient military discipline, very short of good and reliable non-commissioned officers."
151 Most troubling of all to Wilson was that 40,000 troops assumed "an adequate police force is in existence," an assumption that he specifically denied.
152
From the covering memorandum on Wilson's report, it is clear that the problem of insufficient troops to restore order had been a concern of the Cabinet since at least November 18, 1919. 153 In early January 1920, Sir Eric Geddes, Chairman of the Cabinet's Supply and Transport Committee, gave an even more frightened description of the inability of police and army to protect the Government:
The Minister of Labour has reported that there is a possibility of a revolutionary outbreak in Glasgow, Liverpool, or London in the early spring, when a definite attempt may be made to seize the reins of Government. In normal circumstances the chances of success of such an attempt would probably be small, but the danger would, in my opinion, be serious if the attempt were made when the country's resources had already been taxed by the strain of a great industrial crisis, such as a strike of coal miners. It is not inconceivable that a dramatic and successful coup d'etat in some large centre of population might win the support of the unthinking mass of labour, exasperated as the latter is by the increasing cost and difficulty of living.
154
The Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries' January 26, 1920, memorandum Industrial Disturbances echoed this concern: "[T]he revolutionaries in this country have been pushing their propaganda, unhindered and unanswered, and perfecting their arrangements for a trial of strength in March or April."
155
The concerns about the disaffected veterans are now more understandable. A weak army of raw recruits might be successful against unarmed workers with no combat experience, but raw recruits might well break under fire from determined combat veterans.
To reinforce a weak and perhaps untrustworthy police force and army, Cabinet ministers had previously proposed a "citizen guard" of politically reliable men to fight against a Bolshevik revolution.
156 Thomas Jones's notes from the February 2, 1920 conference tell us that " [d] uring the discussion Bonar Law so often referred to the stockbrokers as a loyal and fighting class until one felt that potential battalions of stockbrokers were to be found in every town." anything in the nature of a sympathetic view of his duties has been entirely absent.
78
For that reason I am unwilling to leave anything more to the right hon. Gentleman's unfettered discretion.
176
One of the most interesting objections was from M.P. Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy. His argument was based on the Whig view of history that arms in private hands acted as a restraint on abuses by the government:
In the past one of the most jealously guarded rights of the English was that of carrying arms. For long our people fought with great tenacity for the right of carrying the weapon of the day, the sword, and it was only in quite recent times that that was given up. It has been a well-known object of the Central Government in this country to deprive people of their weapons.
177
After discussing Henry VII's attempt at disarming the great nobles, Kenworthy pointedly warned that disarming the population would not be an effective way of breaking popular control:
I do not know whether this Bill is aimed at any such goal as that but, if so, I would point out to the right hon. Gentleman that if he deprives private citizens in this country of every sort of weapon they could possibly use, he will not have deprived them of their power, because the great weapon of democracy to-day is not the halberd or the sword or firearms, but the power of withholding their labour. I am sure that the power of withholding his labour is one of which certain Members of our Executive would very much like to deprive him.
178
The Earl of Winterton responded that Kenworthy holds the most extraordinary theories of constitutional history and law. His idea is that the State is an aggressive body, which is endeavoring to deprive the private individual of the weapons which Heaven has given into his hands to fight against the State . . . . Holding those views, and believing that it is desirable or legitimate or justifiable for private individuals to arm themselves, with, as far as I understand his remarks, the ultimate intention of using their arms against the forces of the State, he objects to this Bill. There are other people who hold those views in this country, and it is because of the existence of people of that type that the Government has introduced this Bill . . . .
179
Winterton thus stated directly a reason for the bill's introduction that was in line with what Shortt had said in the secrecy of a cabinet meeting, 180 but which was contrary to Shortt's representations to Parliament. 181 In the ensuing exchange, Kenworthy reiterated that "the very foundation of the liberty of the subject in this country is that he can, if driven to do so, resist . When Kenworthy, a liberal, asked Winterton, a conservative, about the Ulster Volunteers, who had threatened rebellion before the war with the encouragement of the Conservative Cabinet minister Bonar Law who was now a part of the Cabinet that sought this law, Winterton refused to answer the question.
184
Winterton also insisted, "Before the War, the majority of the people in this country had almost forgotten that there were such things as firearms. . . ."
185 Our examination of the popular literature from the pre-war period suggests otherwise. The bill passed by a vote of 254 to 6. 187 What significance is there in such a lopsided vote? First of all, Kenworthy was not simply a traditional English gentleman, preserving obsolete liberties for their own sake. Thomson's January 22, 1920, "Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom" devoted an entire heading and paragraph to Kenworthy:
The member for Hull has been very active in his own district during the recess. He has addressed many meetings and has been busy amongst the seafaring population, to whom he has promised his support for an 8 hour day. Under his influence the Hull Junior Liberal meetings have become practically socialist. He is anxious to obtain a passport for Moscow. 188 This would suggest that Kenworthy's interest in widespread arms ownership was not entirely academic. It might also explain why the vote was so lopsided in the House of Commons, where we would expect Kenworthy's views to have been at least as well known as they were to the Director of Intelligence.
What other evidence is there that would tell us something of the purpose of the Firearms Act of 1920? The Firearms Act licensed handguns and rifles. 189 Concealable firearms have been the weapon of choice for criminals for a very long time, simply because they provide an element of surprise. The pre-war laws regulating the purchase and carrying of firearms applied only to handguns for that reason.
If the Firearms Act of 1920 had licensed only handguns, Shortt's claims before the Commons would be at least superficially plausible. If the Firearms Act of 1920 had included all firearms, it might be argued that it had been drafted in an overly broad manner in an attempt to disarm criminals. However, the inclusion of rifles (but not shotguns) in this licensing measure suggests that the fear of Bolshevik revolution expressed throughout more than two years of Cabinet discussions and reports was what really drove this bill. In a revolutionary struggle against soldiers, a shotgun's value is limited because its range is limited. Soldiers armed with rifles can engage an insurgent force armed with shotguns at a distance of 100 to 150 yards with no fear of serious injury, even if the insurgents outnumber the soldiers by a significant margin. Soldiers
